Abstract. Cryptographic protocol designers work incrementally. Having achieved some goals for confidentiality and authentication in a protocol Π1, they transform it to a richer Π2 to achieve new goals. But do the original goals still hold? More precisely, if a goal formula Γ holds whenever Π1 runs against an adversary, does a translation of Γ hold whenever Π2 runs against it? We prove that a transformation preserves goal formulas if a labeled transition system for analyzing Π1 simulates a portion of an lts for analyzing Π2, while preserving progress in that portion. Thus, we examine the process of analyzing a protocol Π. We use ltss that describe our activity when analyzing Π, not that of the principals executing Π. Each analysis step considers-for an observed message reception-what earlier transmissions would explain it. The lts then contains a transition from a fragmentary execution containing the reception to a richer one containing an explaining transmission. The strand space protocol analysis tool cpsa generates some of the ltss used.
Introduction
Protocol design is an art of reuse. A few basic patterns for achieving authentication and confidentiality-despite actively malicious parties-are frequently adapted to new contexts. Designers combine these patterns, piggy-backing values on top of them, to solve many problems. The transformations modify message structure; add new transmissions or receptions on a given role; and add entirely new roles. Constructing protocols may be difficult, particularly for interactions involving more than two participants: Some data values may be shared among subsets of the participants, while remaining hidden from the other participants. Designers use existing protocols as heuristics for parts of the protocol, welding the parts cleverly together, so that the transformed protocol preserves the goals achieved by the components, while achieving additional goals.
Our goal here is not to make this cleverness unnecessary, but to explain it semantically. Thm. 2 justifies inferring that a transformed protocol satisfies some security goals, when the source protocol did. Although a logical result about models of protocol behavior and the formulas they satisfy, it is a corollary of a logic-free theorem (Thm. 1). The latter concerns only fragments of protocol executions (called skeletons), the information-preserving maps (homomorphisms) between them, and some labeled transition systems. These ltss formalize the activity of protocol analysis. Reifying the protocol analysis activity into ltss, and explaining relations between protocols using them, are new in this paper.
Although these results help us avoid verifying the transformed protocol directly, they also have a deeper value. They suggest design principles for incremental construction of protocols. We expect future work to lead to syntactic conditions that imply that a transformation preserves security goals. Protocol design, now a hit-or-miss activity requiring experience and ingenuity, could become a more predictable and possibly tool-supported process.
Structure of this paper. Section 2 introduces two protocols, with two transformations between them, motivating a definition of transformation (Def. 2). Section 3 analyzes these protocols, illustrating how a transformation can preserve the activity of protocol analysis. Section 4 axiomatizes these analysis activities, representing them as labeled transition systems. A simulation-plus-progress relation on ltss ensures that a transformation does not create counterexamples to security goals (Section 5). Section 6 defines classical first order languages L(Π), and defines security goal translations. We lift Thm. 1 to satisfaction of goals (Thm. 2) in Section 7, and comment on related and future work.
Strand Spaces. We work within the strand space theory [18] . A strand is the sequence of message transmissions and message receptions executed by a single principal in a single protocol session. Transmission and reception events jointly are nodes. We will write strands, either horizontally or vertically, as sequences of bullets connected by double arrows: A protocol Π consists of a finite set of strands, called the roles of the protocol, possibly annotated with some trust assumptions that we will not need here. We give each Π a "listener" role, consisting of a single node receiving a message t, which can witness for the disclosure of t. An instance of a role ρ ∈ Π results from choosing values from some reasonable algebra M of messages for ρ's parameters. We formalize this choice by applying a substitution α to ρ, where a substitution α means a homomorphism from M to itself. The strand α(ρ) is the sequence of transmissions and receptions in which each message in ρ is instantiated according to α. That is, each parameter x appearing in ρ is replaced by α(x). Each strand α(ρ) is a regular behavior of some principal in Π, i.e. a local session in which the principal complies with Π. (See [18, Sec. 2.5] .)
A fragmentary execution, called a skeleton, consists of a number of regular strands of Π, or their initial segments. A skeleton A consists of its regular nodes, equipped with (i) a partial ordering A , akin to the Lamport causal ordering [22] ; (ii) some assumptions unique(A) about freshly chosen values; and (iii) some assumptions non(A) about uncompromised long term keys. (See [18, Def. 3 
.1].)
A skeleton A is realized if, whenever n is a reception node in A, an adversary can obtain or construct its message t, without violating the assumptions unique(A) and non(A). No value assumed freshly chosen should equal a guessed or independently chosen value. No long term key assumed uncompromised should be used by the adversary. (See [18, .) A realized skeleton is a full execution. When node n receives t, then the adversary obtains t, or can derive it using transmissions prior to n in the partial ordering A .
Any skeleton A represents a set of realized skeletons B. These are the executions in which at least the transmissions and receptions in A have occurred, possibly made more specific by a substitution α, and node ordering extends A . Moreover, the assumptions α(unique(A)) and α(non(A))-i.e. the images of unique(A) and non(A) under α-must be satisfied. Definition 1. The concatenation of two messages t 0 and t 1 is t 0ˆt1 , and the (asymmetric) encryption of t using the public encryption key of B is {|t|} pk(B) .
The i th node along a strand s, starting from 1, is s ↓ i. We write t 0 t 1 to mean that message t 0 is an ingredient in t 1 , i.e. that t 0 is a subterm of t 1 considering plaintexts but not the keys used to prepare encryptions. That is, is the smallest reflexive transitive relation such that t 0 {|t 0 |} K ; t 0 t 0ˆt1 , and t 1 t 0ˆt1 . The key K used in an encryption {|t 0 |} K is not an ingredient of it, however, unless it was an ingredient of t 0 (contrary to good practice). For instance, N b {|N bˆB |} pk(A) , but pk(A) {|N bˆB |} pk(A) .
A message t 0 originates at a node n iff n is a transmission node, t 0 msg(n), and for all m such that m ⇒ + n, t 0 msg(m). Thus, t 0 originates at n when it was transmitted as an ingredient, but was neither transmitted nor received earlier on the same strand.
If ρ ∈ Π is a role of protocol Π, then instances(ρ) is the set of instances of ρ, i.e. the set {α(ρ) : α is a substitution}. The (larger) set of strands that agree with a member of instances(ρ) on the first i nodes is defined: instances(ρ| i ) = {s : ∃r ∈ instances(ρ) . ∀j ≤ i . s ↓ j = r ↓ j}. So instances(ρ| i ) contains a strand if it is indistinguishable from a run of ρ while only i events have occurred. If r ∈ instances(ρ) agrees with s up to i, then r is an instances(ρ| i )-witness for s.
Some Protocol Transformations
The Protocol HD. HD, one of the simplest possible authentication protocols, is a half-duplex, authentication-only subprotocol of Needham-Schroeder [24] . It is shown in Fig. 1 . HD gives the initiator an authentication guarantee that the responder has participated; it gives the responder no guarantee. HD does not establish any shared secret. The top half of the figure shows the initiator role, first transmitting the encrypted message for B and then receiving the freed nonce N . The bottom half shows the responder role, first receiving the encrypted message and then freeing and transmitting N . A regular strand of HD is any instance of either one of these roles, using any values for the parameters N, B, N , B . We do not show the listener role in this or other protocol diagrams, since it is always present, and simply passively receives a message t.
A skeleton A over HD contains any number of these regular strands, and selects sets of freshness and non-compromise assumptions unique(A) and non(A).
A is realized if an adversary can synthesize the message received on each reception node, using messages transmitted earlier relative to A , without violating the assumptions unique(A) and non(A).
The Yes-or-No Protocol. The Yes-or-No Protocol YN allows a Questioner to ask a question, to which the Answerer gives a private, authenticated reply; YN is constructed by two transformations of HD. In YN, the question and answer should each remain secret. Indeed, the protocol should prevent even an adversary who has guessed the question from determining what answer was given. The Questioner authenticates the Answerer as supplying an answer. The Questioner chooses two random nonces, and encrypts them, together with the question. The Answerer releases the first of the two nonces to indicate a yes, and the second to indicate a no. No adversary learns anything, since whichever nonce was released, the questioner was equally likely to have used it in the other position.
The protocol has four roles ( Fig. 2) . One describes the behavior of a Ques- tioner receiving an affirmative answer. The second describes the behavior of a Questioner receiving a negative answer. The remaining two describe the behavior of an Answerer providing an affirmative and respectively negative answer. We can view either half of this diagram as a transformation of the protocol HD. We first rename the nonces N, N of HD to the affirmative nonces Y 1 , Y 3 , to view the left half in this way. We would rename N, N to the negative nonces N 2 , N 4 for the right half. Before formalizing the transformations, we formalize these renamings as substitutions (homomorphisms) on the message algebra M. The renamings, yielding respectively the protocols α 1 (HD) and α 2 (HD), are:
We could alternatively incorporate substitutions such as α 1 , α 2 into the transformations themselves, but at the cost of complicating the already subtle Def. 2.
Protocol Transformations. By a protocol transformation from a source protocol Π 1 to a target protocol Π 2 , we mean a map from nodes on roles of Π 1 to nodes on roles of Π 2 . The images of nodes of a single role ρ 1 ∈ Π 1 all lie along a single role ρ 2 ∈ Π 2 , so we formalize this with two components: one which selects the correct ρ 2 , and another which is a function g that maps the index of a node on ρ 1 to the index of its image along ρ 2 . Thus: These node index functions g are the identity Id, but other transformations use non-identity gs. For instance, if one principal in YN sent a message before the messages shown, which the other received before the messages shown, then we would alter F 1 , F 2 to use λi . i + 1 to increment each node index. Our examples have several properties. The node index mapping functions are order-preserving, and the transformations also preserve the direction of the nodes (transmission vs. reception). The transmission node n of the HD initiator originates the value N and this value-as renamed by α 1 -also originates on F 1 (n) (see Def. 1). The reception node m of the HD responder receives N msg(m), and we also have α 1 (N ) msg(F 1 (m)). Thus, F 1 preserves the originated values and the ingredients of nodes. Similarly, F 2 preserves these properties of α 2 (N ).
These properties, with one other, define a protocol transformation. This last property is vacuously true of F 1 , F 2 . It concerns branching, as for instance, in a transformation F : YN → Π, QAf and QNg branch after a first node in common. It says that the result in the target Π should not commit to either branch until the source behaviors have committed by diverging from each other.
Definition 2 (Transformation). Suppose F maps each role ρ 1 ∈ Π 1 to a pair ρ 2 , g, where ρ 2 ∈ Π 2 and g :
1. g is order-preserving and g(length(ρ 1 )) ≤ length(ρ 2 );
3 Security Analysis of HD and YN Security analysis aims to find what must have happened-or must not have happened-if a certain situation has arisen. In the case of HD, the relevant analysis considers what must have happened, when there has been a local session of the initiator role. If its nonce N was freshly chosen, and B's private decryption key was uncompromised, what can we be sure has happened? cpsa [26] is a software tool to answer such questions. It starts with an object representing the situation-namely a skeleton A (cf. p. 3)-and generates enriched skeletons to represent all the complete executions compatible with the starting point A. In each step it takes, cpsa locates an unsolved test, some reception node that cannot be explained by adversary activity, given the regular (non-adversarial) activity currently present in the skeleton. For each alternate piece of regular activity that could help explain the current skeleton, cpsa constructs an enriched skeleton; the search branches to explore those enrichments. When every reception node is explained, and the skeleton is realized, cpsa has found a leaf in the search ("a shape").
cpsa implements a labeled transition system. The nodes are skeletons. There is a transition A ; B i if B i is one of the alternate enrichments that explains a test unsolved in A. All of the B i that provide alternate solutions to are successors of A with the same label . A label indicates some unexplained behavior in A that prevents it from being realized; each B i offers a different potential way to fix . Given a protocol Π, security analysis for authentication and confidentiality goals involving the situation A 0 consists of exploring the portion of the lts for Π accessible from A 0 .
Analyzing HD. In HD, the relevant starting skeleton is A 0 , shown on the left in Fig. 3 , where the assumptions-that N was freshly chosen and B's decryp-
tion key is uncompromised-are shown in the caption. cpsa identifies the lower reception node as unexplained, given the assumptions: how did N escape from the encryption {|N |} pk(B) ? It can be solved in only one way, namely, a responder strand can extract N and retransmit it as shown. The result of this step, A 1 , is now realized, i.e. fully explained. Since every realized skeleton that enriches A 0 must solve this test, it must be an enrichment of A 1 . In every situation in which an initiator has acted as in A 0 , a responder has had a corresponding local session. This is A's authentication guarantee, telling A that B has participated in the session.
Transforming our Analysis under F 1 , F 2 . Each transformation F : Π 1 → Π 2 determines a map that lifts any skeleton A of the protocol Π 1 to a corresponding skeleton F (A) of Π 2 . In particular, suppose A contains the first j nodes of a strand s, and s is an instance of a role ρ 1 ∈ Π 1 . Thus, for some substitution β, s = β(ρ 1 ). When F (ρ 1 ) = (ρ 2 , g), then F (A) should contain the first g(j) nodes of a strand F (s). It should be an instance of ρ 2 ∈ Π 2 . Specifically F (s) = β (ρ 2 ), where β agrees with β on all the parameters appearing in the first j nodes of ρ 1 . The remaining parameters of ρ 2 are assigned new values, chosen to be distinct from any of the other values selected for F (A). Since β depends on all of A, it would be more accurate to write F A (s) rather than F (s), although we will not do so.
If we apply first α 1 and then F 1 mechanically to Fig. 3 , we obtain the upper
two skeletons in Fig. 4 . In B 0 , the lower node, which is the image of the unsolved test node of A 0 , is itself an unsolved test node. Moreover, the new strand in B 1 is the image of the one solution in HD. However, B 1 is not realized. There is only one way to complete the search for a realized skeleton, namely to identify corresponding parameters in the questioner and answerer strands of B 1 , setting Q 3 = Q 1 and N 3 = N 1 . The result is B 2 . cpsa generates B 2 from B 0 in one step, which factors through B 1 : To realize B 0 , one must add the information present in B 1 , and also the additional information that Q 3 = Q 1 and N 3 = N 1 . In any YN scenario in which B 0 has occurred, the information in B 1 also holds. Thus, the security analysis of HD has given us sound conclusions about YN. We now formalize this relation.
What is Protocol Analysis?
In our examples, we started with skeletons A 0 , B 0 . They were not large enough to be realized, i.e. to be executions that could really happen without any extra regular behavior. We then enriched them to the realized skeletons A 1 , B 2 .
Homomorphisms. These enrichments are examples of homomorphisms among skeletons [18, Def. 3.6] . A homomorphism H : A · → B between skeletons of Π transforms messages in a structure-respecting way, mapping transmission nodes to transmission nodes and reception nodes to reception nodes. A homomorphism must preserve the ordering relations of the source, and it must preserve its freshness and non-compromise assumptions. It is an information-preserving map.
Homomorphisms determine a preorder, not a partial order, since A
Protocol analysis: A search through · →. Protocol analysis is a search through part of the preorder · →. Skeletons A 0 determine starting points for the search; protocol analysis then seeks realized skeletons C such that A · → C. cpsa computes a set of representative realized skeletons we call shapes. Within the set of all realized B such that A · → B, the shapes are the minimal ones in the node-injective ordering ≤ ni [13] . cpsa's test-and-solution steps form a labeled transition system, where A 0 ; A 1 means that A 0 has an unsolved test described by the label , and A 1 contains one solution to this test. Figs. 3 and 4 give examples of test-and-solution steps. The lts ; is a subrelation of · →.
Indeed, most of the search process works in the partial order ≤ ni . Although cpsa's implementation is somewhat different, its search could be separated into two phases. After an initial non-node-injective step, all of its test-solving could take place in the node-injective ordering (see [18, Thm. 6.5 
]).
Core Idea of this Paper. If F : Π 1 → Π 2 , the portion of the lts for Π 1 accessible from A 0 may simulate the portion of the lts for Π 2 accessible from the Π 2 skeleton F (A 0 ). Since the labels on the two transition systems may differ, in finding the successful simulation, we freely choose a relabeling function ∆ mapping Π 1 labels to Π 2 labels. A simulation using ∆ progresses iff, whenever a Π 1 skeleton A can take some -transition, the Π 2 skeleton F (A) can take some ∆( ) transition. If for some ∆, we have a simulation that progresses, then F preserves all security goals concerning the starting situation A 0 .
We axiomatize the crucial properties of test-and-solution ltss, rather than defining one as a function of Π. This has two advantages. First, we can establish goal preservation using finite, often very small, ltss. Second, particularly for Π 2 , we can use a finer lts (as in Fig. 4 ) or a coarser one than cpsa would generate. Our tltss have the finite image property, i.e. {B : A ; B} is finite for all A, . The non-dead labels in our applications are triples c, E, n 1 , where c is a value received in a new, unexplained form in the node n 1 . "Unexplained" because in n 1 c is not contained within a set of encryptions E. We call E an "escape set," since c has escaped from the protection of the encryptions E before reaching n 1 . In Fig. 3 , c is the nonce N . E is the singleton set { {|N |} pk(B) }, which is the one form in which N has been seen. The node n 1 is the lower (reception) node of A 0 , in which N is suddenly received outside of its encrypted form in E.
For both steps in Fig. 4 , c is the nonce Y 1 , and E is the singleton set { {|Q 1ˆY1ˆN1 |} pk(B1) }, which is the one form in which N b has been seen prior to the test nodes n 1 . In the first step, the test node n 1 is the lower (reception) node of B 0 , in which Y 1 is suddenly received outside of its encrypted form in E. In the second step, the test node n 1 is the upper right (reception) node in B 1 , in which Y 1 is received packaged with the (possibly distinct) values Q 3 , N 3 . The protocol provides no way to perform this repackaging if Q 3 = Q 1 or N 3 = N 1 , so the only possible explanation is to equate them. Non-singleton Es arise naturally in protocols that use a nonce repeatedly, for successive authentication steps.
Lemma 2. Suppose that · ·
; · is a tlts, and A ∈ S(;). If A · → ni C where C is realized, then there exists a realized B such that A ; * B and B · → ni C.
This lemma is an instance of Thm. 1, and can be proved by specializing its proof.
Homomorphisms and Transformations. Homomorphisms are preserved by protocol transformations (Def. 2). Writing Skel(Π i ) for the set of skeletons over Π i , F : Π 1 → Π 2 determines an image operation Skel(Π 1 ) → Skel(Π 2 ). The image operation supplies new values for Π 2 role parameters that do not appear in their Π 1 preimages, using some convention. We write F (A) for A's image.
Lemma 3 ([17]
). Suppose that F : Π 1 → Π 2 is a protocol transformation.
If
that commutes with the image operation.
If G : F (A) · → F (B) is any homomorphism between skeletons of this form
, then G = F (H) for some H : A · → B. 3. If D ∈ Skel(Π 2 ), then {A : F (A) ≤ ni D} has a ≤ ni -maximum in Skel(Π 1 ).
The Preservation Theorem
Preserving protocol goals is about tltss for the two protocols. Assume a relabeling function ∆ : Λ(Π 1 ) → Λ(Π 2 ). The Skel(Π 1 ) argument determines what parameters in A to avoid, when choosing new role parameters. If F, ∆ preserve progress, A ∈ S( ; 1 ) implies F (A) ∈ S( ; 2 ). There may be many ∈ Λ(Π 2 ) outside ran(∆), for instance the second step in Fig. 4 . In F 1 , F 2 , ∆ is determined directly from F i ; in other cases, ∆( ) can use a larger escape set E than the naïve choice suggested by F . Theorem 1 Let F : Π 1 → Π 2 , and ∆ : Λ(Π 1 ) → Λ(Π 2 ). Let ; 1 and ; 2 be tltss with A ∈ S(; 1 ) ⊆ Skel(Π 1 ) and S(; 2 ) ⊆ Skel(Π 2 ). Suppose that:
1. F, ∆ preserve progress for ; 1 and ; 2 ; 2. ; 1 simulates ; 2 under F, ∆.
For every Π 2 -realized C, if H : F (A)· → ni C, there is a Π 1 -realized B such that A ; 1 * B, and the accompanying diagram commutes.
Proof. We use induction on the set {D : 
Hence, the following proper inclusion eliminates an isomorphism class:
i.e. the cardinality (modulo isomorphism) is reduced. Thus, we can apply the induction hypothesis to A in place of A.
Lemma 2 is the special case of Thm. 1 in which F, ∆ are the identity functions.
Although Thm. 1 is not about logical formulas, it has a corollary about security goal formulas for Π 1 . If the Π 2 -realized C is a counterexample to a Π 1 goal formula, then the Π 1 -realized B will also be a counterexample to that goal. 6 The Language L(Π) of a Protocol Π L(Π) is a classical first order language with equality [16] .
1 A formula
is a security goal if (i) φ and each ψ i is a conjunction of atomic formulas, (ii) x and y are disjoint lists of variables, and (iii) all variables free in any ψ i but not in φ is free in y. Null and unary disjunctions (j = 0 or j = 1) are permitted, where the null disjunction ⊥ is the constantly false formula. Since L(Π) says nothing about the structure of Π's messages, it can express goals that are preserved when message structure is transformed. It describes nodes by their role, their index along the role, and the role's parameters.
L(Π) contains function symbols pk(a), sk(a), and inv(a), for a's public encryption key; a's private signature key; and the inverse member of a key pair.
Example 1: L(HD). L(HD) shares some vocabulary with the other L(Π):
expressing node precedence; unique origination of v; unique origination of v at the node n; and non-origination of v. Its protocol-specific relations are:
The predicates AtPos1 and AtPos2 say that a node n lies at the first or second position (resp.) on strand s. Init and Resp say that a strand s is an initiator or responder strand (resp.). Lsn(s) says that s is a listener strand, a purely receptive strand that can witness that a value is disclosed. Peer says that s's name parameter is b, if s is an initiator strand. This name refers to s's intended partner. Self says that s's name parameter is b, if s is a responder strand. This name refers to the active party in this strand, the owner of the decryption key. We use Nonce to say that v is the nonce in either type of strand s. Hear says that s has received the value v, if s is a listener strand. The skeleton A 0 of Fig. 3 satisfies the formula
when we assign s to the initiator strand shown; assign n and m to its first and second nodes resp.; assign b to the name B; and assign v to nonce N . If
then A 1 satisfies Φ 0 ∧ Φ 1 , when we (additionally) assign s to the responder strand shown, and n , m to its first and second nodes resp. The variables b, v are not primed in Φ 1 , expressing the agreement of the initiator and responder strands on these parameters. So Φ 0 ⊃ Φ 1 is an authentication goal. Although HD does not achieve any confidentiality goal, we would express it with a null conclusion, and with the Lsn and Hear predicates in the hypothesis. Letting ⊥ be the vacuously false null disjunction:
would express the secrecy of b.
L(Π) in General. In the previous paragraphs, we created an intuitive relation between a particular protocol Π and the predicates of its language. To do the same thing more generally, we will use a table τ . The table τ should associate a distinct one place predicate with each role. For HD, τ mapped the initiator role to the Init predicate and the responder role to Resp. These are the role predicates. We also have τ associate each pair of a role and parameter of that role to a two place predicate. For HD, τ mapped the initiator role and the parameter N to the predicate Nonce; it also maps the responder role and N to Nonce. These are the parameter predicates. We require (i) role predicates and parameter predicates are disjoint, and (ii) τ maps different parameters of the same role to different parameter predicates. For precision, we could write L τ (Π) for the language determined by a particular choice of τ , but the choice of τ makes no semantically relevant difference in security goals.
We add k position predicates AtPos1(s, n), . . ., AtPosk(s, n), where k is the length of the longest role in Π. L(Π) contains these position predicates, the shared predicates Prec, Unq, UnqAt, Non, and the predicates in the range of τ .
Classical Semantics of L(Π).
Fix a message algebra M. Each skeleton A for Π determines a model for L(Π) where the domain contains the messages in M together with the strands and nodes of A. Given an assignment η mapping free variables to values in the domain, the value η(v) of any term v, involving variables and functions symbols such as pk, etc., is determined by η and M. The satisfaction conditions for the predicates are:
iff for some j > 0, nodes A contains exactly j nodes of η(s), and η(s) ∈ instances(ρ| j ), where τ (ρ) is RolePred; A |= η ParamPred(s, v) iff for some j > 0, nodes A contains exactly j nodes of η(s), and η(s) ∈ instances(ρ| j ), and for every instances(ρ| j )-witness α(ρ) for η(s) has α(a) = η(v), where τ (ρ, a) is ParamPred.
The definition ensures that A |= η φ[s] is never sensitive to the part of η(s) outside A. As in Def. 2, Clause 5, L(Π) is insensitive to not-yet-executed branch points.
This definition also justifies our claims about Φ 0 and Φ 0 ∧ Φ 1 above. Φ 0 is satisfied in both A 0 and A 1 . Indeed, because Φ 0 is a conjunction of atoms, it will be satisfied in every homomorphic image of A 0 . Specifically, if H : A 0 · → C, then composing H with the variable assignment η, we have C |= H•η Φ 0 . Moreover, this is exact: If C |= θ Φ 0 , then for some H :
A is a Φ-characteristic skeleton iff some A, η is a Φ-characteristic pair.
We write A, η = cp(Φ) for the characteristic pair and A = cs(Φ) for the characteristic skeleton, when they exist, since they are unique to within isomorphism. A 0 is the characteristic skeleton of Φ 0 , i.e. A 0 = cs(Φ 0 ), and A 1 = cs(Φ 0 ∧ Φ 1 ). In 
Role-Specific Formulas. A variable s appearing in a role predicate in φ, or as the first argument to a position predicate or a role parameter predicate, is called a strand variable in φ. A variable n appearing as the second argument to a role position predicate, or either argument to an order predicate, or the first argument to an UnqAt predicate, is called a node variable. A conjunction of atoms φ is role specific if strand and node variables are disjoint; every strand variable appears in exactly one role predicate; and every node variable appears in exactly one position predicate. Φ 0 and Φ 0 ∧ Φ 1 are role specific, but Φ 1 alone is not. Node variables m, n occur in no position predicate in Φ 1 . By associativity and commutativity, a role specific φ can be rewritten so every leftmost subformula is role specific. That is, φ is equivalent to φ 0 ∧ ψ 1 where φ 0 is role specific, and if φ 0 is a conjunction φ 1 ∧ ψ 1 , then φ 1 satisfies the same property recursively. This holds because the role predicate for s can precede position and parameter predicates for it, and the position predicate for n can precede Pred and UnqAt predicates for it. As in [16, Thm. 5 
.2]:
Lemma 4. If φ is role specific, the characteristic skeleton cs(φ) is defined.
If Γ is a goal formula as in Eqn. (1), then we say that Γ is role specific if φ is, and each of the conjunctions φ ∧ ψ i is, where 1 ≤ i ≤ j.
Example 2: L(YN).
The language L(YN), like L(HD), has the position predicates AtPos1(s, n) and AtPos2(s, n). It has five role predicates, namely QAf(s), QNg(s), AnAf(s), AnNg(s), and Lsn(s). Again expressing an intended peer via Peer(s, b), and an actual identity via Self(s, b), we have five parameter predicates:
Protocol Transformations and Language Translations. Each F : Π 1 → Π 2 determines a translation Tr F (·) between role specific goal formulas of L(Π 1 ) and L(Π 2 ). We translate conjunctions by translating each conjunct. Let F (ρ 1 ) = (ρ 2 , g). The order and assumption predicates are translated verbatim. For the remaining predicates, we use the tables τ 1 and τ 2 .
RolePred1(s):
If RolePred1 is τ 1 (ρ 1 ), translate it to τ 2 (ρ 2 ). PosPredi(s, n): Because the formula is role specific, there is a single conjunct RolePred1(s) with the same s. If RolePred1 is τ 1 (ρ 1 ), then letting the index j = g(i), the result is PosPredj(s, n).
ParamName1(s, t): Again, there is a single conjunct RolePred1(s) with this s, by role specificity. Let RolePred1 be τ 1 (ρ 1 ), and ParamName1 be τ 1 (ρ 1 , a) . Select the predicate ParamName2 to be τ 2 (ρ 2 , a).
If either (i) a does not appear in ρ 2 , or (ii) for all parameters a of ρ 1 , ParamName1 is not τ 1 (ρ 1 , a) , then the result is vacuously true: s = s ∧ t = t.
If φ ∧ ψ i is role specific, Tr φ F (ψ) translates ψ i the same way, using conjuncts of φ to provide the specification of the roles. We have ensured that fv(Tr F (φ)) = fv(φ) and fv(Tr
For the goal formula Γ 1 describing Fig. 3 , Tr F1 (Γ 1 ) is:
If η is an variable assignment taking values in A, define η to be the corresponding assignment taking values in F (A). In particular, η agrees with η for variables whose value is a message. For variables whose value is a strand or node, we have η(v) = F (η(v)), so that η is the composition of η with the "image" map from A to F (A).
If B |= θ Tr F (φ) and cp(φ) = A, η, then there exists a J such that J : F (cs(φ)) · → B, and θ agrees with J • η on fv(φ). 4. If φ is role specific, then cs(Tr F (φ)) exists, and F (cs(φ)) = cs(Tr F (φ)).
Proof. 1. We left-associate conjunctions, so that when φ is φ 1 ∧ φ 2 , φ 2 is atomic. We also assume that φ is written in the order defined before Lemma 4, so every leftmost subformula of φ is also role specific. We use structural induction on φ. Base case: If φ is the trivially true conjunction with 0 conjuncts, then Tr F (φ) is also the null conjunction, which is true in every structure. Induction step: Let φ be φ 1 ∧ φ 2 , where the claim holds for φ 1 , and φ 2 is atomic. When φ 2 uses Prec, Unq, UnqAt, Non, or =, the claim follows from the definitions.
If φ 2 is a role predicate RoleName(s), η(s) is a strand with at least one node in A, and all of its nodes in A agree with an initial segment of an instance of the associated role ρ 1 . Thus, its F -image in F (A) has at least g(1) nodes in A and all of its nodes in A agree with an initial segment of an instance of the corresponding role ρ 2 . Hence F (A) |= η Tr F (φ 2 ). Position predicates are similar.
Let φ 2 be a parameter predicate ParamName(s, t). Since φ is role specific, there is just one RoleName(s) with the same s in φ 1 , and A |= η RoleName(s). Thus, Tr F (φ 2 ) is the F -corresponding parameter name predicate, and the F -image of η(s) has the same parameter η(t). Hence, F (A) |= η Tr F (φ 2 ).
2. Tr F (φ ∧ ψ) entails Tr φ F (ψ), and Clause 1 implies F (A) |= η Tr F (φ ∧ ψ). 3. By Lemma 4, cs(φ) exists. By the properties of cs [16] , each strand with nodes in A is η(s) for some distinct s in a role predicate in φ. If A contains i nodes of η(s), then there is a node position predicate for i, s, and some n. Moreover, each parameter to the associated role ρ takes an atom or indeterminate as its value in η(s), not a concatenation or encryption.
We will construct a J :
If a is a parameter to η(s), then α(a) is the corresponding parameter to θ(s). By the universality of cs(φ) and of F (A), J = [φ, α] is a homomorphism.
4. By the syntax, Tr F (φ) is role specific, so Lemma 4 implies cs(Tr F (φ)) exists. By the previous clause, J : F (cs(φ)) · → cs(Tr F (φ)).
By clause 1, F (cs(φ)) |= η Tr F (φ). Thus, Def. 5 entails that K : cs(Tr F (φ))· → F (cs(φ)). Hence, by the uniqueness in Def. 5, J • K = Id. Hence, F (cs(φ)) and cs(Tr F (φ)) are isomorphic.
Preserving Security Goal Formulas
Π achieves a goal formula Γ iff, for all realized Π-skeletons C, C |= Γ . Theorem 2 Let F : Π 1 → Π 2 , and let φ be goal specific with A = cs(φ).
Suppose Π 1 achieves the goal Γ = ∀x . (φ ⊃ ∃y . ψ 1 ∨ . . . ψ j ), and assume there exists a ∆ and tltss ; 1 and ; 2 as in Thm. 1, i.e. A ∈ S(; 1 ) and 1. F, ∆ preserve progress for ; 1 and ; 2 ; 2. ; 1 simulates ; 2 under F, ∆.
Then Π 2 achieves Tr F (Γ ).
. Suppose that C is any Π 2 -realized skeleton and θ is a variable assignment.
If 
Since, by assumption, Π 1 achieves Γ , it follows that B |= ζ ψ i , for some ψ i and some ζ s.t. ζ |x = (L • η) |x. By Lemma 5, Clause 2, we can lift this to F (B), so that
H is not node-injective. By [18, Thm. 6.5] , there is a K 0 : F (A) · → D that is universal among homomorphisms equating the nodes that H equates, and for some node-injective H 0 , H = H 0 • K 0 . Apply Case 1 to H 0 and D.
Related Work The safe protocol transformation problem is not new. As an idea for protocol design, it goes back at least to Bird et al. [5] . In a key special case, "protocol composition," it dates from the 1990s [21, e.g.]. In the protocol composition case, roles of Π 1 also appear unchanged as roles of Π 2 . Since Π 2 may also have additional roles not in the image of Π 2 , composition is thus effectively the case in which Π 1 ⊆ Π 2 . While there has been an extensive literature devoted to this special case, the more general type of transformation discussed here has seen very little progress. Our view is that the effects of a syntactic change in message structure on protocol behavior are very hard to predict (given an active adversary model). This has made it hard to reason about the full notion of transformation, as opposed to the special case of composition. We have introduced the tlts as a representation of the protocol analysis problem to tame this complexity.
Focusing then on protocol composition, it has been very successfully treated in a cryptographic model. A strong form of composition is reactive simulatability [25, 3] or universal composability [7] ; weaker forms may still be cryptographically justified [12] .
In the symbolic model, we previously provided a widely applicable and practically useful criterion [19, 14] . Cortier et al.'s criterion is in some ways broader but in other ways narrower than ours [8] ; cf. [1] . Our [15] covers the union of [19, 8, 1] . From one point of view, the contribution of the present paper is to generalize [15] beyond the composition case.
The Protocol Composition Logic PCL considers refinements that preserve security goals [11, Thms. 4.4, 4.8] . A specific proof of a goal formula relies on particular invariants. If a protocol refinement introduces no actions falsifying these invariants, it preserves the security goal. Although PCL was designed to support richer forms of transformation, the existing results are essentially confined to the composition case. [11] 's "parallel" and "sequential" composition amounts to Π 1 ⊆ Π 2 . Datta et al. ' s "protocol refinement using templates" [10] suggested many of our examples.
By contrast with Distributed Temporal Logic [6] , L(Π) is intended to be less expressive about the forms of messages. We wanted to focus only on what is retained under transformation, which concerns the role parameters rather than the forms of the messages. Nevertheless, our logic, unlike DTL, being a quantified logic, satisfaction is undecidable.
Lowe and Auty [23] refine protocols to concrete messages starting from formulas in a Hoare-like logic that represent the effect of messages. Maffei et al. [2] express the effects of messages by abstract tags, and provide constraints on instantiating the tags by concrete messages.
"Protocol compilers" transform their input automatically. Some start with a crypto-free protocol, and transform it into a protocol meeting security goals [9, 4] . Others transform a protocol secure in a weak adversary model into protocols satisfying those goals with multi-session, active adversary [20] .
Future work. We leave a major gap: What syntactic property of F : Π 1 → Π 2 ensures that F preserves security goals? A clue comes from the "disjoint encryption" property [19, 15] , cf. [23, 8] . Consider a map E from all encrypted units used by Π 1 to a subset of the encrypted units of Π 2 . Π 2 should create an encryption α(E(e)) on node n only if n = F (n 0 ) and n 0 creates α(e) in Π 1 . Likewise, Π 2 should remove an ingredient from α(E(e)) only on a node n = F (n 0 ) where n 0 removes an ingredient from α(e) in Π 1 .
Tool support is also required. cpsa generates some tlts transition relations. We then construct others, and the simulations, by hand. A variant of cpsa that would explore two protocols in tandem would be of great interest.
